Causes of Instability in Afghan Pak Region

Causes of Instability in Afghan Pak Region DURAND LINE AND PAKHTOON DIVIDE AS THE CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN AFGAN PAK REGION CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Durand Line[i], the notorious frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some people blame this frontier for all of Afghanistans current problems. And there are those who go so far as to blame it for the problems in Pakistan. Indeed, there are those who blame the Durand line not just for terrorism and other problems of instability in Pakistan, but even for the terrorist attacks suffered in London in July 2005, tracing their origins all the way back to the tribal agencies of North- West Pakistan. 2. Some people have even been so bold as to say that everything in Afghanistan would be sorted out if only the United States could cross over the frontier and ‘do its thing there. Such commentators seem little daunted by the fact that British administrators spent 150 years trying in vain to resolve the same problems which confront us today. The region that is today known as Afghanistan was long torn by ethnic and tribal rivalries. 3. The strategic significance of Afghanistan was not lost on either the British Empire or the Soviets. And hence, Afghanistan became a buffer between Communism and the West. Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but the approximate 1500 mile long Durand Line along Pakistan remains the most dangerous. Kabul has never recognised the line as an international border, instead claiming the Pashtun territories in Pakistan that comprise the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of North West Frontier Province along the border. 4. The geo strategic importance of Afghanistan has been a major factor in foreign policy formulations Pakistan. Afghanistan has always provided the much-needed strategic depth to Pakistan in all its policies against India. The Durand Line, becomes a very important factor as the Durand line, is still not accepted by the Pashtuns on either side. 5. In view of the above, it is essential to identify the fault line i.e. the Pakhtoon Divide and turbulent relationship between the two nations as the source of instability in the region, with specific reference to its effect on Afghan Pakistan relations. The study, while briefly looking at the events leading genesis of the problem will attempt to analyse whether turbulent Pakistan Afghanistan relations(which have not been cordial in spite of geographical contiguity and identity of religion, cultural and economic interests) and Pakhtoon divide legacy as the cause of instability in the region. METHODOLOGY Statement of the Problem 6. To analyse whether instability in Afghan Pak region can be attributed to turbulent relationship between the two nations and Pakhtoon Divide legacy. Justification for the Study 7. Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but the approximate 1500 mile long Durand Line along Pakistan remains the most dangerous. Kabul has never recognised the line as an international border, instead claiming the Pashtun territories in Pakistan that comprise the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of North West Frontier Province[ii] along the border.Incidents of violence have increased on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border since the U.S led war in Afghanistan. In the last several years, U.S. officials and national intelligence reports have repeatedly attributed the growing strength of Al-Qaeda and resurgence of the Taliban to safe havens in this border region. 8. The rise of Taliban and the support provided to them by Pakistan has given a different complexion to the Afghan Pak crisis. Taliban led Afghanistan is an ally of Pakistan and the ambit of their relations cover Islamic fundamentalism, support to Kashmir militants and even strategic depth to Pakistan in the event of hostilities with India. Hence it is important to carry out an analysis of the reasons for instability in Afghan Pak region. Scope 9. This study concentrates on the historical perspectives, the Pakhtoon issue, the stands of both the nations on Pakhtoon issue, relations and policies adopted by both the countries which have led Afghanistan Pakistan region into a troubled area and rise of insurgency leading to instability in the region. Data Collection 10. The study is primarily based on information gathered from books written by authors of Indian, western origin and other Afghanistan experts. Other sources of information are articles written in Indian newspapers, defense journals and periodicals have been referred. Various internet sites too have been accessed to get the latest inputs. A detailed bibliography of sources is appended at the end of the text. Organisation of the Dissertation 11. The study will be covered under the following heads :- (a) Chapter II : The Pakhtoonian Issue: Study of Legacy. (b) Chapter III : Conflicting Stands on Pakhtoonian Issue. (c) Chapter IV : Pak Afghan Relations and Pakhtoonian Issue. (d) Chapter V : Pakistans Afghan Policy. (e) Chapter VI : The Insurgency in The Border Area and Threat to Region. (f) Chapter VII : Recommendations. 12. Chapter II The Pakhtoonian Issue: Study Of Legacy. This chapter gives an overview of the historical perspective of the complexity of the present Pak Afghan relations which can be comprehended by understanding the historical background to the Pakhtoonian issue. In this chapter, an attempt has been made to analyse the British and Russian policies of imperialism and competition in Central and South Asia which compelled the to regard Afghanistan as ‘Zone of Interpenetration. The British ‘outer oriented ‘ frontier policy in the north western boders of India which resulted in vague ill defined Indo Afghan border and later hostile Pak Afghan relations. 13. Chapter III Conflicting Stands on Pakhtoonian Issue. The bitterness and hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan are an imperial legacy and arbitrary segregation of Pakhtoons by the Durand Line in disregard of their ethnic affinities. Both countries have come to loggerheads many a times over Pakhtoonian issue. This chapter analyses arguments advanced by both the countries in favor of their positions. 14. Chapter IV Pak Afghan Relations and Pakhtoonian Issue. This chapter deals with the Pastunistan Issue and Pak Afghan relations, wherein it is argued that the domestic restraints imposed by internal dynamics of the two countries have been responsible for continuation of hostilities. 15. Chapter V Pakistans Afghan Policy. This chapter will cover the interests of Pakistan in pursuing policies to give it control over Afghanistan and their unstinted support to the Taliban to accomplish this endeavor. 16. Chapter VI -The Insurgency In The Border Area And Threat to Region. The Talibanisation of Afghanistan and the various implications/threats it holds for the region would be analysed in the chapter. 17. Chapter VII Recommendations. The Road Ahead CHAPTER II The first and most important advice that I can give to my successors and people to make Afghanistan into a great kingdom is to impress upon their minds the value of unity; unity, and unity alone, can make it into a great power. Abdur Rehman Khan Amir of Afghanistan (1880-1901) THE PAKHTOONIAN ISSUE: STUDY OF LEGACY 1. The complexity of the present Afghan Pak relations can be comprehended better with some political background that led to Pakhtoonian issue[iii] a question relating to legal and political status of the trans Afghan Pakhtoons. 2. The Pakhtoons are ancient tribes[iv], they inhibited the eastern highlands and mountains of Afghanistan when Alexander armies passed through that area to invade India in the 4th century B.C. Afghanistan, as an independent country, is a recent phenome ­non. When Ahmed Shah Abdali was selected as the king by the Afghan tribes there was then no such thing as Afghanistan. The first thing for him to do, therefore, was to bring together various Afghan districts into one political unit. The period after the death of Ahmed Shah in 1773 saw a lot of confusion and intense struggle for power in Afghanistan. By that time the British had established themselves in most parts of India, extending their authority up to the Sutlej. 3. Meanwhile in the early 19th century the Sikh power under Ranjit Singh flourished in Punjab. The dominion of Ranjit Singh expanded considerably in the north-west as a result of political confusion in Afghanistan and extended up to the east of the Khyber Pass.[v] After the fall of the Sikh empire in 1849, the British occupied Sikh possessions, which brought them into direct contact with the Afghan territory for the first time.[vi] It is important to note that Afghanistans boundaries were not clearly defined at that time which gave rise to a number of uneasy and unhappy positions as the British and Russian empires exploited the vagueness of Afghan frontiers. 4. After the conquest of Punjab, the British influence unmis ­takably spread north-west ward. But the British were not the only power that was consolidating its position in the region. The Russians were also advancing in the same direction which made the British uneasy. They knew that Afghanistan having undefined boundaries is the only country between their empire and Russia. Finding direct control over Afghanistan expensive and difficult because of the rocky and mountainous land and Pakhtoons â€Å"tradi ­tional love of independence, Britain wanted to have an independent and strong—though not too strong—Afghanistan as a barrier to the expansion of Russian influence. In other words, the British were keen to make Afghanistan a buffer state between Russia and the British India. Afghanistan thus found itself caught in a vice between the two great powers. Close Border or Forward Policy 5. But boundaries looked increasingly important. By the 1840s the Russians had reached the Aral Sea and were slowly being drawn into Central Asia. In 1849 the Punjab passed into British hands, as did Sindh. By this point British India had as its effective border the foothills of the mountains where dwelt the Pushtun hill tribes. The tribes saw no reason to stop their traditional raids just because the territory was now British. So, like the Mughuls and Sikhs before them, the British were faced with the problem of how to control the tribes. 6. They tried first the ‘Close Border Policy'[vii] which held as a principle that British sovereignty should not be extended to areas which could not be governed effectively. Accordingly the foothills were fortified to keep out the hill-based tribal peoples and irregular troops, levies, were raised to resist attacks on the population of the foothills. To keep the tribesmen sweet, the British tried making agreements with them, they tried friendship, they tried goodwill, they tried allowances for good behavior, giving them money to provide services to keep the roads open, to protect communications, to deny sanctuary to outlaws in contravention of their tribal codes. But this didnt work very well. Expedition after expedition went into the hills to chastise the tribal people. Yet this was all much in vain, clear signs that this ‘close border policy was not working. 7. As the 19th century progressed, another approach was devised: the ‘Forward Policy'[viii], called the Sandeman system, which involved capturing and holding areas in the tribal zones in the hills. Strong points were captured, fortified, garrisoned and connected by roads which would be protected. The tribes would be allowed to run their own affairs in the hope they would gradually come under the influence of the British government. But this forward policy inevitably raised the question of where the border between British India and Afghanistan should be set. At the same time fears were growing about the advance of the Russian Empire. By the 1870s the Russians had been able to capture the great Central Asian cities of Bokhara, Samarkand and Khiva. Hence the appeal of the ‘forward policy which in its most extreme form posited that the frontier be pushed as far forward as possible, ideally to the genuine or ‘scientific frontier of the Hindu Kush, with Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar forming the first line of defense. This idea found brief expression in the Second Afghan war of 1878 1880 when the British invaded Afghanistan again and found themselves trying to hold the old Mughal frontier. But they failed not because of the Russians, but because of Afghan resistance. The Durand line[ix] 8. By the 1880s the Russians had advanced further and were pressing on the river Oxus and Afghanistan itself. By 1893, the British had concluded that formal borders needed to be established between Afghanistan and British India, so that everyone would know where they stood and the Russian advance could be held off from the British Empire in India. The man sent to negotiate was the Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand. 9. Durands main concern was to secure Afghanistans northern border with Russia. A first settlement had been made in 1885 using the Oxus River but the boundary had not been taken all the way east into the region of the Pamirs and the Wakhan. Durand was desperate to make sure that this part of the border was absolutely clear so that the Russians could not sneak down through the Pamir Mountains into northern India. The Amir dangled that card before Durand to get a better deal when the frontier between British India and Afghanistan was negotiated. It is not the case that the British presented a clearly thought-out proposal for a particular line for the frontier and threatened a further invasion if their proposal was not accepted. There was a lot of give and take in the negotiation. The Amir put forward an ambitious boundary proposal, the British suggested a very different frontier line which would include Waziristan in British India. After lot of to and fro, ultimately the Afghans agreed that Dir, Swat, Peshawar and Chitral should be British. In return the Afghans secured some strategic strong points, notably Asmar, which gave them access to Nuristan and various of Afghanistans eastern regions.[x] 10. Then, at the very last moment, when agreement had been reached that all of Waziristan would be British, Durand, almost as an afterthought, possibly as a concession to allow the Amir to gain a little face, suddenly allowed the Amir to keep the Birmal tract of Waziristan. This was not the best of ideas, since it involved splitting Waziristan and the tribal people in two. But it may be that the maps from which the Amir and Durand were working were not very good, for when the demarcation teams went out into the field to try to delimit the boundary, there were areas represented on the map which did not exist on the ground and vice versa. Memoirs indicate that the Amir was pleased with the settlement reached. Nevertheless at the same time the Amir secretly spread propaganda against the British, saying that he was not pleased and that it would be a good thing to move the Line over towards the east. 11. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan ruled Afghanistan for the last two decades of the 19th century. He was prevented from expanding externally by Russia in the North and North East, the British in the North and North West and Persia in the East. Internally, he was also surrounded by many difficulties. His first priority was to consolidate his position internally. After he had satisfactorily consolidated his position to an extent, he turned towards reforms that he felt were necessary for making Afghanistan a great nation in the future. Amir felt that reforms would not be possible until a boundary line was marked along the perimeter of Afghanistan so that people could know what provinces really belonged to Afghanistan.[xi] 12. The Durand Line (refer Appendix ), as demarcated between 1893 and 1896, was drawn all the way from the Persian frontier to the Wakhan, the little area on which the British insisted to keep a distance between the British and Russian Empires. There were two exceptions which at that time remained undemarcated, an area in the region of Chitral and another area a little north of the routes towards Kabul the country of the Mohmand tribe. The demarcation team tried to make the line as sensible as possible by using natural features, such as mountain crests, streams and rivers as boundaries, thus splitting up areas of river drainage. They also tried to set up boundary pillars so that there was some physical evidence of the boundary. 13. A close look at the route of this 1900 mile long boundary, indicates that the first section follows the crest of the Hindu Kush Mountains, where there is only the occasional pass. This section was actually very secure, for given the height and the cold it was difficult to moves forces across the area. Next the Line moves further down towards the Mohmand hills, where there was one of the undemarcated sections. There are still few passes of importance in this region. However coming down to the vital strategic region, the number of passes increases. There is of course the Khyber Pass, another important pass in the Kurram Agency, and a third, the Tochi pass, which was an important trade and invasion route in the old days. Further on, in the area of Waziristan, the Line does not follow mountain crests and peaks so clearly. It is convoluted, following various peoples agricultural rights and field boundaries. The Line splits at least 12 villages in half and divides other villages from t heir agricultural territories. It becomes easier to follow further south where most of the land is just desert. 14. The line cuts tribes and tribal groups in half. The Birmal tract of Waziristan is on the Afghanistan side, with the rest of Waziristan on the British or Pakistani side. The Mohmand tribal areas are also cut in two. And, inevitably, because the border is generally in a very distant set of areas, it is highly porous and difficult to police, especially when family groups are on both sides. Particularly in Waziristan, there are many passes and paths through which it is easy to move from British India (or Paki- stan) into Afghanistan and back. 15. There were advantages of the Line for the British. There was a strategic advantage in that they held positions forward of the passes and controlled the heights, thus facilitating the policing of the passes. They also managed to achieve the tripartite border a vision they had held for a long time.[xii] The first part of the border was the buffer state, Afghanistan. The second part was the tribal areas in the hills, which the British did not try to govern, but simply garrisoned. These areas were vassal states, on the Indian side of the line but not under the sovereignty of British India. The third part was further back, where the real government of India started. The depth of this frontier system certainly kept the Russians away, but the corollary was that the British faced the familiar internal policing problem. 16. There were also advantages for the Afghans. As the ruler of Afghanistan was trying to unify his country and make it into a coherent state. Because he had been given a set of clear boundaries, it was much easier for him to project his power within those boundaries and to know that he would not be interfered with. Further north, he was able for the first time to extend his sway right up to the frontier. 17. For the people on the ground, there was not much of a practical effect. They still had freedom of movement. In the 1893 Treaty which he signed with Durand, Abdur Rahman promised not to try to project his influence over the border. But that did not stop him from inviting the tribesmen from those regions to Kabul and giving them honours, robes, money, guns anything to keep them sweet, anything to keep them on side.[xiii] 18. In 1904 Lord Curzon decided to divide the area to make it easier to administer. Originally the whole area was part of the Punjab. Lord Curzon split it off and created a government of the North Western Frontier Province. He established tribal areas beyond the administrative boundary of India where the Indian government did not presume to govern with regular laws. Different laws were set up for these tribal areas, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which had been in force in various forms since the 1870s, were now applied in a systematic way. They are a harsh set of laws, with some alarming implications and are still in force today, more or less in the form in which the British left them. All policing, executive and judicial functions are in the hands of a political agent, who is answerable, via a commissioner, originally directly to the government in Delhi, but now to the President of Pakistan. Political agents handle relations with tribes via chosen notables, called Maliks, who are subsidised and paid to keep order. 19. As for justice, the principle of collective responsibility and collective punishment still applies. Other members of the tribe can be held responsible for any crime committed by a member of the tribe. A tribal agent can hold a jirga, inviting several Maliks to help him decide points of fact in civil and criminal cases. But even then, the decision of this artificial court is not binding on the political agent. The cases are decided under customary law. There is also a Pakistan version of the West Lothian question. The frontier areas return members to the national Parliament, but the laws passed by the Parliament are not valid in the frontier areas unless there is a Presidential approval. Until 1996 there was no referendum and political parties were outlawed in those regions. 20. At the moment of independence for India and Pakistan there was a legal curiosity. The legal status of these areas changed. All the agreements they had were not with the government of India, for they were not part of British India. Their agreements were actually directly with the British Crown. Thus, legally speaking, at independence all these agreements lapsed and the tribal areas became independent.By November Pakistan had made arrangements with the tribesmen under which their relations with Pakistan would be on the same basis as their relations with the British. That is how Pakistan came to control these areas. They did not inherit them; they found them as de facto semi-sovereign independent territories. 21. There was a lot of bad feeling there has been between Pakistan and Afghanistan on account of the border. In 1948 Afghanistan voted against Pakistan joining the United Nations. Pakistan delayed Afghan import and export goods on the border. Afghan radio called for independence for Pashtunistan. In 1949 Pakistan inadvertently attacked Afghanistan territory by air, a skirmish followed. Shortly afterwards a loya jirga, a great council in Kabul, repudiated all the boundary treaties made with the British, gave support to the idea of an independent Pashtunistan and urged that all the people in those areas should be given a referendum and the right to vote to join Afghanistan. In 1950 there was an incursion into the tribal areas by Afghan forces disguised as tribesmen. These were repulsed by Pakistan Pashtuns. Pakistan stopped Afghan imports for three months. In 1954 1955 the government of Pakistan decided to change the countrys administrative structure. Instead of having separate provinces such as Punjab and Sind, they tried to establish a single unified administrative area of West Pakistan to balance East Pakistan now Bangladesh. Afghanistan saw it as the tribal areas being taken away from their potential influence. There was no war, but diplomatic relations became frosty in the extreme. 22. Pakistan sees Afghanistan as a hinterland which it wants to control as a fallback position, should there be any further conflict with India over Kashmir. The greatest concern however is controlling Kabul and stopping any more of these problems coming back over the borderline. With the 1980s and the Soviet invasion it seemed perfect sense to use the tribal areas as a point for launching the Mujahedin into Afghanistan. Again in the 1990s, its isolation made it the perfect place, not only to host those engaged in the fight for independence in Kashmir, but also to train the Taliban before they moved to control most of Afghanistan. In 2001 the area was again as a refuge for the Taliban. This suited the Pakistani government. They could maintain the Taliban areas as a Talibanised belt between Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the government set up by the West in Afghanistan were to fall, this would give them the liberty to move back and to project their influence there. However, by pursuing this policy Pakistan has created a monster which it cannot control. The Afghan Taliban are fine for interfering in Afghanistan but the area has become a well of religious fanaticism as much opposed to the Pakistani government as it is to the Afghan government. 23. Where does this leave us? Afghanistan does not recognise the Durand Line as a legal international boundary. The Afghans claim agreement to the Line was obtained under duress. They question whether the documentation was in order. They sometimes suggest that the British made up the agreement after returning home. They also question whether Amir Abdur Rahman understood what he was really signing up to, whether he understood the maps and whether he actually intended the boundary to be a legal international boundary. They complain that, at the moment of independence, the Pashtuns were not given the option of full self-determination. They were only given the choice between joining India and joining Pakistan, not independence or joining Afghanistan. They say the jirgas held between Pakistan and the tribal people were probably not in order. They say that the treaties made between the British and the Afghans lapsed at the moment of Independence, for they claim that Pakistan is not a valid successor state to British India.[xiv] 24. Pakistan, of course, holds an entirely opposite viewpoint, arguing that the frontier, the Durand Line, is a legitimate international boundary, in 1893 and confirmed by later treaties in 1905, 1919, 1921 and 1930. Pakistanis hold themselves to be the inheritors of the British legal rights at the moment of independence. 25. When the Line was drawn in 1895 1896, many of the British officials held the view that the Line was never meant to be an international boundary. It was a Line that delimited areas of influence, not sovereignty. There are various other legal considerations. In international law, lines dividing spheres of influence often develop into proper international boundary lines, sometimes even without the explicit say-so of the states concerned. What international adjudicators look at is not just the original treaties; these can often be very unimportant. What matters is the practice of the states. 26. The Line is convoluted, but there are many convoluted borders all over the world where there are no problems. The real problem is that the Line itself generates instability, it is not policeable, and the constitution of the Tribal Areas does not permit economic development to take place. In the 60 years since independence Pakistan has not been able to bring these areas under proper administration. They remain a well of instability, which cannot help harming the relation and ultimate interests of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. With such a peculiar constitutional status in the Tribal Areas, there is no real possibility of stability, of establishing the rule of law, a sound banking system, the accountability of local officials, or putting in place the frameworks necessary for business and commerce. CHAPTER III When Allah had made the rest of the world, He saw there was a lot of rubbish left over, bits and pieces and things that did not fit anywhere else. He collected them all together and threw them down on the earth. That was Afghanistan.[xv] An old Afghan Saying. CONFLICTING STANDS ON PAKHTOONIAN ISSUE 1. The bitterness and hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan are an imperial legacy and the result of the arbitrary segregation of Pakhtoons by the Durand Line in disregard of their ethnic affinities. The two countries have come to loggerheads many a time over the Pakhtoonistan Issue[xvi]. Before analysing the arguments advanced by both the countries in favor of their positions, it is necessary to .be clear about the concept of Pakhtoonistan. The issue of Pushtunistan is closely linked with the Durand Line as a troublesome tribal boundary. Afghanistan, following the argument that the Durand Line was accepted under pressure, contends that Pushtuns living on either side should have the right of self- determination, as they were forcibly separated from their motherland. Secondly, the Afghan government argues that the inhabitants of Pushtunistan are one nation and that the Durand Line arbitrarily splits the nation into two[xvii]. 2. Pakhtoonistan, conceived as a hypothetical state by Pakistan, has been defined differently by three distinct sources, i.e. the Afghans, the Pakhtoons living outside Pakistan and the Pakhtoons within Pakistan. According to Afghan official sources, Pakhtoonistan broadly comprises two provinces of Pakistan, i.e. North-West Frontier and Baluchistan. In other words it extends from Baluchistan in the south to Chitral and Gilgit in the north. According to another version, the Pakhtoon leaders in Pakistan, like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Wali Khan, explained that to them Pakhtoonistan had always meant the existing province of NWFP which should be renamed after the Pakhtoons and granted autonomy within Pakistan. 3. The total area of Pakhtoonistan is nearly 39,259 square miles. Politically, the area is divided into two sections—the tribal territory and the settled districts. Though language has been described as the most practical touchstone of identity of the people, there is a lacuna in Pakhtoonistan. Almost all people in Pakhtoonistan speak Pushto or Pakhto, but in some places, which are not inha ­bited by the Pakhtoons, the language of the people is not Pushto. Hence, it evident that all people in Pakhtoonistan do not speak Pushto or Pakhto. In view of the importance of the Pakhtoonistan issue in foreign policy adopted by Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is neces ­sary to analyse in some detail the positions taken by the two countries. Afghanistan Case 4. The claims of the Afghans are based on the assumption that the Pakhtoons are akin to them from the ethnic, linguistic, geographical, historical as well as traditional points of view. Their main contention is that Afghanistan accepted the Durand agreement under duress as Amir Abdur Rahman had been operating under several internal and external constraints while negotiating with the British. The line drawn in accordance with that treaty was invalid, by which, the Afghans argued, their blood brothers had been forcibly separated. Second, as the British Government in India has ceased to exist, they also contend that the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 is null and void. Thus, they have laid claim to all areas between the Durand Line and the River Indus.[xviii] 5. At the time of partition, the fate of the North-West Frontier province was left undecided, pending a referendum. The Afghan government indicated that under no circumstances it would accept the outcome of the referendum as a fair mea ns of resolving the problem. Afghanistans argument is that the decision on the `referendum was taken unilaterally by the British government. But a decision, in order to be valid, should be taken by all the concerned parties in mutual consultation with one another. More ­over, it was pleaded that the Pakhtoons were given the limited choice to join either India or Pakistan only and not the option to unite with their motherl Causes of Instability in Afghan Pak Region Causes of Instability in Afghan Pak Region DURAND LINE AND PAKHTOON DIVIDE AS THE CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN AFGAN PAK REGION CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Durand Line[i], the notorious frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some people blame this frontier for all of Afghanistans current problems. And there are those who go so far as to blame it for the problems in Pakistan. Indeed, there are those who blame the Durand line not just for terrorism and other problems of instability in Pakistan, but even for the terrorist attacks suffered in London in July 2005, tracing their origins all the way back to the tribal agencies of North- West Pakistan. 2. Some people have even been so bold as to say that everything in Afghanistan would be sorted out if only the United States could cross over the frontier and ‘do its thing there. Such commentators seem little daunted by the fact that British administrators spent 150 years trying in vain to resolve the same problems which confront us today. The region that is today known as Afghanistan was long torn by ethnic and tribal rivalries. 3. The strategic significance of Afghanistan was not lost on either the British Empire or the Soviets. And hence, Afghanistan became a buffer between Communism and the West. Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but the approximate 1500 mile long Durand Line along Pakistan remains the most dangerous. Kabul has never recognised the line as an international border, instead claiming the Pashtun territories in Pakistan that comprise the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of North West Frontier Province along the border. 4. The geo strategic importance of Afghanistan has been a major factor in foreign policy formulations Pakistan. Afghanistan has always provided the much-needed strategic depth to Pakistan in all its policies against India. The Durand Line, becomes a very important factor as the Durand line, is still not accepted by the Pashtuns on either side. 5. In view of the above, it is essential to identify the fault line i.e. the Pakhtoon Divide and turbulent relationship between the two nations as the source of instability in the region, with specific reference to its effect on Afghan Pakistan relations. The study, while briefly looking at the events leading genesis of the problem will attempt to analyse whether turbulent Pakistan Afghanistan relations(which have not been cordial in spite of geographical contiguity and identity of religion, cultural and economic interests) and Pakhtoon divide legacy as the cause of instability in the region. METHODOLOGY Statement of the Problem 6. To analyse whether instability in Afghan Pak region can be attributed to turbulent relationship between the two nations and Pakhtoon Divide legacy. Justification for the Study 7. Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but the approximate 1500 mile long Durand Line along Pakistan remains the most dangerous. Kabul has never recognised the line as an international border, instead claiming the Pashtun territories in Pakistan that comprise the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of North West Frontier Province[ii] along the border.Incidents of violence have increased on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border since the U.S led war in Afghanistan. In the last several years, U.S. officials and national intelligence reports have repeatedly attributed the growing strength of Al-Qaeda and resurgence of the Taliban to safe havens in this border region. 8. The rise of Taliban and the support provided to them by Pakistan has given a different complexion to the Afghan Pak crisis. Taliban led Afghanistan is an ally of Pakistan and the ambit of their relations cover Islamic fundamentalism, support to Kashmir militants and even strategic depth to Pakistan in the event of hostilities with India. Hence it is important to carry out an analysis of the reasons for instability in Afghan Pak region. Scope 9. This study concentrates on the historical perspectives, the Pakhtoon issue, the stands of both the nations on Pakhtoon issue, relations and policies adopted by both the countries which have led Afghanistan Pakistan region into a troubled area and rise of insurgency leading to instability in the region. Data Collection 10. The study is primarily based on information gathered from books written by authors of Indian, western origin and other Afghanistan experts. Other sources of information are articles written in Indian newspapers, defense journals and periodicals have been referred. Various internet sites too have been accessed to get the latest inputs. A detailed bibliography of sources is appended at the end of the text. Organisation of the Dissertation 11. The study will be covered under the following heads :- (a) Chapter II : The Pakhtoonian Issue: Study of Legacy. (b) Chapter III : Conflicting Stands on Pakhtoonian Issue. (c) Chapter IV : Pak Afghan Relations and Pakhtoonian Issue. (d) Chapter V : Pakistans Afghan Policy. (e) Chapter VI : The Insurgency in The Border Area and Threat to Region. (f) Chapter VII : Recommendations. 12. Chapter II The Pakhtoonian Issue: Study Of Legacy. This chapter gives an overview of the historical perspective of the complexity of the present Pak Afghan relations which can be comprehended by understanding the historical background to the Pakhtoonian issue. In this chapter, an attempt has been made to analyse the British and Russian policies of imperialism and competition in Central and South Asia which compelled the to regard Afghanistan as ‘Zone of Interpenetration. The British ‘outer oriented ‘ frontier policy in the north western boders of India which resulted in vague ill defined Indo Afghan border and later hostile Pak Afghan relations. 13. Chapter III Conflicting Stands on Pakhtoonian Issue. The bitterness and hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan are an imperial legacy and arbitrary segregation of Pakhtoons by the Durand Line in disregard of their ethnic affinities. Both countries have come to loggerheads many a times over Pakhtoonian issue. This chapter analyses arguments advanced by both the countries in favor of their positions. 14. Chapter IV Pak Afghan Relations and Pakhtoonian Issue. This chapter deals with the Pastunistan Issue and Pak Afghan relations, wherein it is argued that the domestic restraints imposed by internal dynamics of the two countries have been responsible for continuation of hostilities. 15. Chapter V Pakistans Afghan Policy. This chapter will cover the interests of Pakistan in pursuing policies to give it control over Afghanistan and their unstinted support to the Taliban to accomplish this endeavor. 16. Chapter VI -The Insurgency In The Border Area And Threat to Region. The Talibanisation of Afghanistan and the various implications/threats it holds for the region would be analysed in the chapter. 17. Chapter VII Recommendations. The Road Ahead CHAPTER II The first and most important advice that I can give to my successors and people to make Afghanistan into a great kingdom is to impress upon their minds the value of unity; unity, and unity alone, can make it into a great power. Abdur Rehman Khan Amir of Afghanistan (1880-1901) THE PAKHTOONIAN ISSUE: STUDY OF LEGACY 1. The complexity of the present Afghan Pak relations can be comprehended better with some political background that led to Pakhtoonian issue[iii] a question relating to legal and political status of the trans Afghan Pakhtoons. 2. The Pakhtoons are ancient tribes[iv], they inhibited the eastern highlands and mountains of Afghanistan when Alexander armies passed through that area to invade India in the 4th century B.C. Afghanistan, as an independent country, is a recent phenome ­non. When Ahmed Shah Abdali was selected as the king by the Afghan tribes there was then no such thing as Afghanistan. The first thing for him to do, therefore, was to bring together various Afghan districts into one political unit. The period after the death of Ahmed Shah in 1773 saw a lot of confusion and intense struggle for power in Afghanistan. By that time the British had established themselves in most parts of India, extending their authority up to the Sutlej. 3. Meanwhile in the early 19th century the Sikh power under Ranjit Singh flourished in Punjab. The dominion of Ranjit Singh expanded considerably in the north-west as a result of political confusion in Afghanistan and extended up to the east of the Khyber Pass.[v] After the fall of the Sikh empire in 1849, the British occupied Sikh possessions, which brought them into direct contact with the Afghan territory for the first time.[vi] It is important to note that Afghanistans boundaries were not clearly defined at that time which gave rise to a number of uneasy and unhappy positions as the British and Russian empires exploited the vagueness of Afghan frontiers. 4. After the conquest of Punjab, the British influence unmis ­takably spread north-west ward. But the British were not the only power that was consolidating its position in the region. The Russians were also advancing in the same direction which made the British uneasy. They knew that Afghanistan having undefined boundaries is the only country between their empire and Russia. Finding direct control over Afghanistan expensive and difficult because of the rocky and mountainous land and Pakhtoons â€Å"tradi ­tional love of independence, Britain wanted to have an independent and strong—though not too strong—Afghanistan as a barrier to the expansion of Russian influence. In other words, the British were keen to make Afghanistan a buffer state between Russia and the British India. Afghanistan thus found itself caught in a vice between the two great powers. Close Border or Forward Policy 5. But boundaries looked increasingly important. By the 1840s the Russians had reached the Aral Sea and were slowly being drawn into Central Asia. In 1849 the Punjab passed into British hands, as did Sindh. By this point British India had as its effective border the foothills of the mountains where dwelt the Pushtun hill tribes. The tribes saw no reason to stop their traditional raids just because the territory was now British. So, like the Mughuls and Sikhs before them, the British were faced with the problem of how to control the tribes. 6. They tried first the ‘Close Border Policy'[vii] which held as a principle that British sovereignty should not be extended to areas which could not be governed effectively. Accordingly the foothills were fortified to keep out the hill-based tribal peoples and irregular troops, levies, were raised to resist attacks on the population of the foothills. To keep the tribesmen sweet, the British tried making agreements with them, they tried friendship, they tried goodwill, they tried allowances for good behavior, giving them money to provide services to keep the roads open, to protect communications, to deny sanctuary to outlaws in contravention of their tribal codes. But this didnt work very well. Expedition after expedition went into the hills to chastise the tribal people. Yet this was all much in vain, clear signs that this ‘close border policy was not working. 7. As the 19th century progressed, another approach was devised: the ‘Forward Policy'[viii], called the Sandeman system, which involved capturing and holding areas in the tribal zones in the hills. Strong points were captured, fortified, garrisoned and connected by roads which would be protected. The tribes would be allowed to run their own affairs in the hope they would gradually come under the influence of the British government. But this forward policy inevitably raised the question of where the border between British India and Afghanistan should be set. At the same time fears were growing about the advance of the Russian Empire. By the 1870s the Russians had been able to capture the great Central Asian cities of Bokhara, Samarkand and Khiva. Hence the appeal of the ‘forward policy which in its most extreme form posited that the frontier be pushed as far forward as possible, ideally to the genuine or ‘scientific frontier of the Hindu Kush, with Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar forming the first line of defense. This idea found brief expression in the Second Afghan war of 1878 1880 when the British invaded Afghanistan again and found themselves trying to hold the old Mughal frontier. But they failed not because of the Russians, but because of Afghan resistance. The Durand line[ix] 8. By the 1880s the Russians had advanced further and were pressing on the river Oxus and Afghanistan itself. By 1893, the British had concluded that formal borders needed to be established between Afghanistan and British India, so that everyone would know where they stood and the Russian advance could be held off from the British Empire in India. The man sent to negotiate was the Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand. 9. Durands main concern was to secure Afghanistans northern border with Russia. A first settlement had been made in 1885 using the Oxus River but the boundary had not been taken all the way east into the region of the Pamirs and the Wakhan. Durand was desperate to make sure that this part of the border was absolutely clear so that the Russians could not sneak down through the Pamir Mountains into northern India. The Amir dangled that card before Durand to get a better deal when the frontier between British India and Afghanistan was negotiated. It is not the case that the British presented a clearly thought-out proposal for a particular line for the frontier and threatened a further invasion if their proposal was not accepted. There was a lot of give and take in the negotiation. The Amir put forward an ambitious boundary proposal, the British suggested a very different frontier line which would include Waziristan in British India. After lot of to and fro, ultimately the Afghans agreed that Dir, Swat, Peshawar and Chitral should be British. In return the Afghans secured some strategic strong points, notably Asmar, which gave them access to Nuristan and various of Afghanistans eastern regions.[x] 10. Then, at the very last moment, when agreement had been reached that all of Waziristan would be British, Durand, almost as an afterthought, possibly as a concession to allow the Amir to gain a little face, suddenly allowed the Amir to keep the Birmal tract of Waziristan. This was not the best of ideas, since it involved splitting Waziristan and the tribal people in two. But it may be that the maps from which the Amir and Durand were working were not very good, for when the demarcation teams went out into the field to try to delimit the boundary, there were areas represented on the map which did not exist on the ground and vice versa. Memoirs indicate that the Amir was pleased with the settlement reached. Nevertheless at the same time the Amir secretly spread propaganda against the British, saying that he was not pleased and that it would be a good thing to move the Line over towards the east. 11. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan ruled Afghanistan for the last two decades of the 19th century. He was prevented from expanding externally by Russia in the North and North East, the British in the North and North West and Persia in the East. Internally, he was also surrounded by many difficulties. His first priority was to consolidate his position internally. After he had satisfactorily consolidated his position to an extent, he turned towards reforms that he felt were necessary for making Afghanistan a great nation in the future. Amir felt that reforms would not be possible until a boundary line was marked along the perimeter of Afghanistan so that people could know what provinces really belonged to Afghanistan.[xi] 12. The Durand Line (refer Appendix ), as demarcated between 1893 and 1896, was drawn all the way from the Persian frontier to the Wakhan, the little area on which the British insisted to keep a distance between the British and Russian Empires. There were two exceptions which at that time remained undemarcated, an area in the region of Chitral and another area a little north of the routes towards Kabul the country of the Mohmand tribe. The demarcation team tried to make the line as sensible as possible by using natural features, such as mountain crests, streams and rivers as boundaries, thus splitting up areas of river drainage. They also tried to set up boundary pillars so that there was some physical evidence of the boundary. 13. A close look at the route of this 1900 mile long boundary, indicates that the first section follows the crest of the Hindu Kush Mountains, where there is only the occasional pass. This section was actually very secure, for given the height and the cold it was difficult to moves forces across the area. Next the Line moves further down towards the Mohmand hills, where there was one of the undemarcated sections. There are still few passes of importance in this region. However coming down to the vital strategic region, the number of passes increases. There is of course the Khyber Pass, another important pass in the Kurram Agency, and a third, the Tochi pass, which was an important trade and invasion route in the old days. Further on, in the area of Waziristan, the Line does not follow mountain crests and peaks so clearly. It is convoluted, following various peoples agricultural rights and field boundaries. The Line splits at least 12 villages in half and divides other villages from t heir agricultural territories. It becomes easier to follow further south where most of the land is just desert. 14. The line cuts tribes and tribal groups in half. The Birmal tract of Waziristan is on the Afghanistan side, with the rest of Waziristan on the British or Pakistani side. The Mohmand tribal areas are also cut in two. And, inevitably, because the border is generally in a very distant set of areas, it is highly porous and difficult to police, especially when family groups are on both sides. Particularly in Waziristan, there are many passes and paths through which it is easy to move from British India (or Paki- stan) into Afghanistan and back. 15. There were advantages of the Line for the British. There was a strategic advantage in that they held positions forward of the passes and controlled the heights, thus facilitating the policing of the passes. They also managed to achieve the tripartite border a vision they had held for a long time.[xii] The first part of the border was the buffer state, Afghanistan. The second part was the tribal areas in the hills, which the British did not try to govern, but simply garrisoned. These areas were vassal states, on the Indian side of the line but not under the sovereignty of British India. The third part was further back, where the real government of India started. The depth of this frontier system certainly kept the Russians away, but the corollary was that the British faced the familiar internal policing problem. 16. There were also advantages for the Afghans. As the ruler of Afghanistan was trying to unify his country and make it into a coherent state. Because he had been given a set of clear boundaries, it was much easier for him to project his power within those boundaries and to know that he would not be interfered with. Further north, he was able for the first time to extend his sway right up to the frontier. 17. For the people on the ground, there was not much of a practical effect. They still had freedom of movement. In the 1893 Treaty which he signed with Durand, Abdur Rahman promised not to try to project his influence over the border. But that did not stop him from inviting the tribesmen from those regions to Kabul and giving them honours, robes, money, guns anything to keep them sweet, anything to keep them on side.[xiii] 18. In 1904 Lord Curzon decided to divide the area to make it easier to administer. Originally the whole area was part of the Punjab. Lord Curzon split it off and created a government of the North Western Frontier Province. He established tribal areas beyond the administrative boundary of India where the Indian government did not presume to govern with regular laws. Different laws were set up for these tribal areas, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which had been in force in various forms since the 1870s, were now applied in a systematic way. They are a harsh set of laws, with some alarming implications and are still in force today, more or less in the form in which the British left them. All policing, executive and judicial functions are in the hands of a political agent, who is answerable, via a commissioner, originally directly to the government in Delhi, but now to the President of Pakistan. Political agents handle relations with tribes via chosen notables, called Maliks, who are subsidised and paid to keep order. 19. As for justice, the principle of collective responsibility and collective punishment still applies. Other members of the tribe can be held responsible for any crime committed by a member of the tribe. A tribal agent can hold a jirga, inviting several Maliks to help him decide points of fact in civil and criminal cases. But even then, the decision of this artificial court is not binding on the political agent. The cases are decided under customary law. There is also a Pakistan version of the West Lothian question. The frontier areas return members to the national Parliament, but the laws passed by the Parliament are not valid in the frontier areas unless there is a Presidential approval. Until 1996 there was no referendum and political parties were outlawed in those regions. 20. At the moment of independence for India and Pakistan there was a legal curiosity. The legal status of these areas changed. All the agreements they had were not with the government of India, for they were not part of British India. Their agreements were actually directly with the British Crown. Thus, legally speaking, at independence all these agreements lapsed and the tribal areas became independent.By November Pakistan had made arrangements with the tribesmen under which their relations with Pakistan would be on the same basis as their relations with the British. That is how Pakistan came to control these areas. They did not inherit them; they found them as de facto semi-sovereign independent territories. 21. There was a lot of bad feeling there has been between Pakistan and Afghanistan on account of the border. In 1948 Afghanistan voted against Pakistan joining the United Nations. Pakistan delayed Afghan import and export goods on the border. Afghan radio called for independence for Pashtunistan. In 1949 Pakistan inadvertently attacked Afghanistan territory by air, a skirmish followed. Shortly afterwards a loya jirga, a great council in Kabul, repudiated all the boundary treaties made with the British, gave support to the idea of an independent Pashtunistan and urged that all the people in those areas should be given a referendum and the right to vote to join Afghanistan. In 1950 there was an incursion into the tribal areas by Afghan forces disguised as tribesmen. These were repulsed by Pakistan Pashtuns. Pakistan stopped Afghan imports for three months. In 1954 1955 the government of Pakistan decided to change the countrys administrative structure. Instead of having separate provinces such as Punjab and Sind, they tried to establish a single unified administrative area of West Pakistan to balance East Pakistan now Bangladesh. Afghanistan saw it as the tribal areas being taken away from their potential influence. There was no war, but diplomatic relations became frosty in the extreme. 22. Pakistan sees Afghanistan as a hinterland which it wants to control as a fallback position, should there be any further conflict with India over Kashmir. The greatest concern however is controlling Kabul and stopping any more of these problems coming back over the borderline. With the 1980s and the Soviet invasion it seemed perfect sense to use the tribal areas as a point for launching the Mujahedin into Afghanistan. Again in the 1990s, its isolation made it the perfect place, not only to host those engaged in the fight for independence in Kashmir, but also to train the Taliban before they moved to control most of Afghanistan. In 2001 the area was again as a refuge for the Taliban. This suited the Pakistani government. They could maintain the Taliban areas as a Talibanised belt between Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the government set up by the West in Afghanistan were to fall, this would give them the liberty to move back and to project their influence there. However, by pursuing this policy Pakistan has created a monster which it cannot control. The Afghan Taliban are fine for interfering in Afghanistan but the area has become a well of religious fanaticism as much opposed to the Pakistani government as it is to the Afghan government. 23. Where does this leave us? Afghanistan does not recognise the Durand Line as a legal international boundary. The Afghans claim agreement to the Line was obtained under duress. They question whether the documentation was in order. They sometimes suggest that the British made up the agreement after returning home. They also question whether Amir Abdur Rahman understood what he was really signing up to, whether he understood the maps and whether he actually intended the boundary to be a legal international boundary. They complain that, at the moment of independence, the Pashtuns were not given the option of full self-determination. They were only given the choice between joining India and joining Pakistan, not independence or joining Afghanistan. They say the jirgas held between Pakistan and the tribal people were probably not in order. They say that the treaties made between the British and the Afghans lapsed at the moment of Independence, for they claim that Pakistan is not a valid successor state to British India.[xiv] 24. Pakistan, of course, holds an entirely opposite viewpoint, arguing that the frontier, the Durand Line, is a legitimate international boundary, in 1893 and confirmed by later treaties in 1905, 1919, 1921 and 1930. Pakistanis hold themselves to be the inheritors of the British legal rights at the moment of independence. 25. When the Line was drawn in 1895 1896, many of the British officials held the view that the Line was never meant to be an international boundary. It was a Line that delimited areas of influence, not sovereignty. There are various other legal considerations. In international law, lines dividing spheres of influence often develop into proper international boundary lines, sometimes even without the explicit say-so of the states concerned. What international adjudicators look at is not just the original treaties; these can often be very unimportant. What matters is the practice of the states. 26. The Line is convoluted, but there are many convoluted borders all over the world where there are no problems. The real problem is that the Line itself generates instability, it is not policeable, and the constitution of the Tribal Areas does not permit economic development to take place. In the 60 years since independence Pakistan has not been able to bring these areas under proper administration. They remain a well of instability, which cannot help harming the relation and ultimate interests of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. With such a peculiar constitutional status in the Tribal Areas, there is no real possibility of stability, of establishing the rule of law, a sound banking system, the accountability of local officials, or putting in place the frameworks necessary for business and commerce. CHAPTER III When Allah had made the rest of the world, He saw there was a lot of rubbish left over, bits and pieces and things that did not fit anywhere else. He collected them all together and threw them down on the earth. That was Afghanistan.[xv] An old Afghan Saying. CONFLICTING STANDS ON PAKHTOONIAN ISSUE 1. The bitterness and hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan are an imperial legacy and the result of the arbitrary segregation of Pakhtoons by the Durand Line in disregard of their ethnic affinities. The two countries have come to loggerheads many a time over the Pakhtoonistan Issue[xvi]. Before analysing the arguments advanced by both the countries in favor of their positions, it is necessary to .be clear about the concept of Pakhtoonistan. The issue of Pushtunistan is closely linked with the Durand Line as a troublesome tribal boundary. Afghanistan, following the argument that the Durand Line was accepted under pressure, contends that Pushtuns living on either side should have the right of self- determination, as they were forcibly separated from their motherland. Secondly, the Afghan government argues that the inhabitants of Pushtunistan are one nation and that the Durand Line arbitrarily splits the nation into two[xvii]. 2. Pakhtoonistan, conceived as a hypothetical state by Pakistan, has been defined differently by three distinct sources, i.e. the Afghans, the Pakhtoons living outside Pakistan and the Pakhtoons within Pakistan. According to Afghan official sources, Pakhtoonistan broadly comprises two provinces of Pakistan, i.e. North-West Frontier and Baluchistan. In other words it extends from Baluchistan in the south to Chitral and Gilgit in the north. According to another version, the Pakhtoon leaders in Pakistan, like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Wali Khan, explained that to them Pakhtoonistan had always meant the existing province of NWFP which should be renamed after the Pakhtoons and granted autonomy within Pakistan. 3. The total area of Pakhtoonistan is nearly 39,259 square miles. Politically, the area is divided into two sections—the tribal territory and the settled districts. Though language has been described as the most practical touchstone of identity of the people, there is a lacuna in Pakhtoonistan. Almost all people in Pakhtoonistan speak Pushto or Pakhto, but in some places, which are not inha ­bited by the Pakhtoons, the language of the people is not Pushto. Hence, it evident that all people in Pakhtoonistan do not speak Pushto or Pakhto. In view of the importance of the Pakhtoonistan issue in foreign policy adopted by Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is neces ­sary to analyse in some detail the positions taken by the two countries. Afghanistan Case 4. The claims of the Afghans are based on the assumption that the Pakhtoons are akin to them from the ethnic, linguistic, geographical, historical as well as traditional points of view. Their main contention is that Afghanistan accepted the Durand agreement under duress as Amir Abdur Rahman had been operating under several internal and external constraints while negotiating with the British. The line drawn in accordance with that treaty was invalid, by which, the Afghans argued, their blood brothers had been forcibly separated. Second, as the British Government in India has ceased to exist, they also contend that the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 is null and void. Thus, they have laid claim to all areas between the Durand Line and the River Indus.[xviii] 5. At the time of partition, the fate of the North-West Frontier province was left undecided, pending a referendum. The Afghan government indicated that under no circumstances it would accept the outcome of the referendum as a fair mea ns of resolving the problem. Afghanistans argument is that the decision on the `referendum was taken unilaterally by the British government. But a decision, in order to be valid, should be taken by all the concerned parties in mutual consultation with one another. More ­over, it was pleaded that the Pakhtoons were given the limited choice to join either India or Pakistan only and not the option to unite with their motherl

5 Bases of Power and Leadership Essay

When we mention the word â€Å"Power† most of the people will think that power is evil, corrupt, self-serving, manipulative and hurtful. However, there is a positive face to addressing power acquisition, power-base development, and power use. When power is used in an ethical and purposeful way, there is nothing evil about it. Leadership is â€Å"interpersonal influence, exercised in a situation, and directed, through communication process, toward the attainment of a specified goal or goals. (Tannenbaum, Weschler, & Massarik, 1961, p. 24). Sales Leadership regularly acquires and uses power to accomplish specific work goals and to strengthen their own positions to empower salesperson rather than dominate them. There are five different powers that affect leadership which include expert power, referent power, legitimate power, reward power and coercive power. Expert power is define as a major source f personal power is expertise in solving problems and performing important task. (French & Raven, 1959) Expert power is needed for those employees who need task direction. It also builds confidence in the leader’s ability to teach and delegate tasks that the team needs to accomplish. The more important problem is to the target person, the greater the power derived by the agent from the possessing the necessary expertise to solve it. With the expert power it helps the leaders to develop and maintain a reputation for technical expertise and strong credibility. Moreover, Charisma leader have the expert power and also have insight into the needs, hopes, and values of followers and are able to motivate commitment to proposals and strategies change.

Sia Singapore Airline

Executive Summary The report provides an overview of the company and its environment. The paper identifies various resources and capabilities available to the company. The various strategies that Singapore Airlines utilise and how they affect the airlines performance. Key issues have been identified that threaten Singapore Airlines current market. The often complicated Government regulations and global laws that affect the airline industry have been defined and explained. Current industry issues and trends that affect Singapore Airlines have been researched, a number of recommendations have been provided, as a possible solution.Overview of Singapore Airlines Singapore Airlines (SIA) first flights began in 1947 partnered with Malaysian Airlines, each funded by there governments. The two airlines mainly serviced South East Asia. Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965 to become the republic of Singapore. The two governments therefore decided to go there own ways and set up there own airlines. In 1972 Singapore Airlines was launched. The domestic market was basically non existent due to Singapore being a small country geographically.Singapore Airlines had to immediately pursue an international presence and started planning flight routes, airport resources, and government acceptance into foreign destinations etc. SIA also had to establish themselves as a genuine competitor and market the airline internationally to potential customers and future stakeholders. Today, SIA has more than 10,000 employees and 95 aircrafts. The airline now serves 89 destinations around the world including Asia, Europe, North America, Middle East, Australasia, and Africa. ( www. airlines. priceline. om) SIA is situated at Changi Airport along with subsidiaries Silkair and Tiger Airlines. ‘In 2004, Changi Airport received a record 30,400,000 passengers, a year-on-year growth of 23. 1% in passenger traffic. Similarly, a record 1,780,000 tonnes of cargo was moved, representing a year- on-year increase of 10. 2% in airfreight volume’. (http://en. wikipedia. org). Changi Airport is classed as â€Å"the hub of Asia†, Changi provides stopovers, refuelling, and passenger exchange for all the international airlines travelling from one side of the world to the other.Changi Airport is also expanding to accommodate for there cut price airline and new Airbuses arriving in 2006. Analysis of Singapore Airlines Environment In analysing the environment, the important external influences that effect performance and decisions of Singapore airlines have been detailed in this section. The airline industry has been strongly controlled by agreements and policies. Airlines couldn’t just fly to any destination or country without appropriate authorisation. Most countries have there own national airline that are generally government backed and hold a big influence on there operation.The governments also implement policies and regulations to control foreign airline a ccess to there airports. Some countries now have deregulated there national airline industry to reduce the amount of government control, and make access to airports/services more open for negotiation. Countries that have employed this action are the United States, Australia, European Union and Japan. The deregulation of the Airline industry opens doors for more entrants to the market and increased competition.Singapore Airlines is still owned by the Singapore government and is still affected by such controls. The Singapore government has signed an agreement with the United States called â€Å"Open Skies† that gives both countries unrestricted flight access to each others countries. The open skies phenomenon is gathering momentum and more and more countries are signing up. Singapore Airlines is currently in negotiations with Australia, to reach an agreement regarding open skies access down under. Basically the countries that gain open skies agreements are able to expand on exi sting business.The airline industry is highly competitive industry and the rival airlines are always taking advantage of any opportunity to gain more destinations. Statistics show Asia’s population is steadily increasing every year and this contributes to the increase in flights. Asia is recognised as the hotspot for air travel at present and into the future. Asia-Pacific intercontinental flights are up 7% and there has been growth of 8% intra-regional services (www. oag. com). This interest in the area has seen new cut price airlines emerge to cater for the demand. SIA has established its own low price airline Tiger Airlines to satisfy demand.Other environmental factors influencing SIA and the airline industry are rising fuel prices. The price rise in fuel causes a cost increase in the running of flights, therefore a rise in ticket prices. SIA have just passed a decision to put a US$10 surcharge on ticket prices to accommodate the fuel rise. Terrorism has caused massive econ omic losses for airline industry and also bankruptcy. Terrorism strikes happen at any time without warning and destinations around the world that are directly affected by terrorism attacks see a dramatic stop in airline flights.The airlines cannot predict these attacks from happening and have to build such occurrences into there risk management policies. Review of the Industry Structure In analysing the industry structure this report uses Porters 5 Forces. The five forces look at the Threat of New Entrants, Power of Suppliers, Power of Buyers, Availability of Substitutes, and Competitive Rivalry. Threat of New Entrants: The international airline industry has high barriers to entry for a number of reasons, firstly there are quite high costs involved in setting up an industry.As mentioned previously, gaining flight access to foreign countries and obtaining airport space is another hurdle that stands in the way of new entrants. The current airlines dominating the industry are constantl y working on maximising cost efficiency, and performance to discourage any new entrants and to try force out existing poor operators. The Domestic industry is more attractive to new entrants as it doesn’t have as much complications as the international side and lower barriers to entry. Power of Suppliers: The aircraft suppliers of the airline industry are dominated by two suppliers Boeing and Airbus.The aircrafts engines are standardised so both aircraft manufacturers have similar engines. Boeing and Airbus both outsource there parts for there planes and generally use the same suppliers. The body frames and interiors is where the two manufacturers can differentiate there product. Due to the standardisation of engines the switching costs of suppliers is reduced and airlines. (De Melo, 2000) Power of Buyers: The power of buyers is low in the airline industry as switching costs are high. Most airlines are similar inside; it’s more the service that sets them apart.Most air lines follow each other on prices and cause buyers to pay there price, on the other hand new entrants my cause price competition and therefore a buyers market. (www. fool. com). Availability of Substitutes: The substitutes that could threaten the airline are cars, boats and trains. These substitutes are not that much of a threat to aeroplane travel. Airlines are generally is used to cover large distances in a short period of time, and was establish to fill a demand that the other forms of travel couldn’t accommodate as effectively.Alternate measures of transport are more of a personal choice not a direct parallel substitute. (www. fool. com). Competitive Rivalry: The airline industry is highly competitive and price wars are a common occurrence. There is constant fighting for territory and expansion. Major players in the industry concentrate on lowering there costs and improving service to deter new entrants. What Key resources available to Singapore Airlines? Singapore Airlin es is a well establish international airline with strong profitable track record.The company has a government ownership and also private stakeholders. The airline has always been profitable and the funds reinvested back into the company, to build on capital. The table below shows that last 3 years financials and even in the case of the S. A. R. S breakout in 2004 they still posted a profit. [pic] Aside from just financial capital, Singapore Airlines has many other resources listed below: †¢ Changi airport the home of Singapore Airlines is one of the largest freight handling facilities in the world, and is the most popular hub in Asia. †¢Singapore has a resource of about 95 aircrafts that now are brought internally and not leased; the aircrafts are generally replaced every 4-5 years. †¢ Singapore Airlines has built a mass of 89 international flight destinations. †¢ The airline has built a human resource training facility. †¢ Changi Airport hosts SIA state of art engineering company that services there planes and other international airlines. SIA also has one of the largest flight kitchens in the world situated at Changi. †¢ SIA belongs to the Star Alliance where other airlines join resources together to increase coverage around the world.Star alliance covers 790 airports in 138 countries. †¢ Finally the brand attribute, is probably there most powerful resource. â€Å"Singapore Girl you’re a great way to fly† Has been strongly nurtured over the last 32 years to be the most recognised brand and icon in the airline industry, Singapore Airline has many capabilities that support there resources, these are: †¢ Latest technological and communication products linking there global network. †¢ Huge investment in human resources, this provides highly skilled workers and management. †¢ Expansive destination coverage due to Star Alliance. State of the art freight facilities that link with the port shipping auth ority What it takes to be successful in the Airline Industry and What strategies are used by Singapore Airlines? Singapore Airlines is basically the trend setter of the airline industry. SIA has employed many innovative strategies since it began. These strategies have been supported and strengthen over the years, and have led to the success, the company enjoys today. To be successful in the airline industry you have to employ superior efficiency, quality, innovation and customer responsiveness.SIA has exercised a quality/service differentiation strategy to become one of the leaders in the passenger airline industry. ‘Singapore Airlines has carefully built a financial and fixed cost infrastructure which allows them to continue investing to support the brand while challenging the competition on costs’. (www. venturerepublic. com) More recently Singapore Airlines became a member with the star alliance, which helps the company maintain economies of scale by code sharing, wh ere SIA can offer services on another airline under its own flight codes and offer more destinations.By building solid capital the airline now enables them to purchase aircrafts and equipment internally without the need for leases and interest. This has enable SIA to have the latest aircrafts and renew them every 5 years. By having a new fleet the company is able to be more efficient with regards to fuel economy, maintenance, and have less downtime. (www. venturerepublic. com). Another benefit of owning aircrafts outright gives flexibility if there is a dramatic decline in the economy, SIA has the freedom of not being locked into long leases and aircrafts can be disposed of, if need be.Therefore they can handle the ups and downs of the economy, more so than competitors. (www. venturerepublic. com). Singapore Airlines have always concentrated on being innovative, as mentioned above they replace there airlines every 4-5 years taking advantage of new technology. The company has always the first to introduce new innovative ideas for example hot meals, free alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks, Hot towels, personal entertainment systems, and video on demand. SIA will also be the first to own the new Airbus Super jumbo A-380 in 2006. www. allaboutbranding. com) SIA is committed to providing a world class quality and service, the airline allocates a substantial amount of time and money into there staff training and education. The company has 4 training facilities with various programs that exercise classroom, work experience and simulation strategies. (www. trainersdirect. com) SIA has more concentration on staff training than any other airline. Singapore Airlines employees have to complete a 4 month training course before they are even allowed to serve a customer.On average in 1997 Singapore Airlines spent $5600 per staff per year on training. The emphasis on staff training is so they can provide the best quality service. (www. trainersdirect. com) The branding of SIA is based on quality. SIA have the strongest brand name in the airline industry. â€Å"Singapore girl you’re a great way to fly† has been there brand of quality for the last 32 years. ‘The icon has become so strong that Madame Tussaud’s Museum in London started to display the Singapore Girl in 1994 as the first commercial figure ever’. (www. venturerepublic. com).The airline provides the best on flight cuisine including fine wines, and cocktails. Complimentary gifts are received on each level of passenger class. SIA have maintained a policy that once a passenger pays for there ticket there is no more to pay. (www. venturerepublic. com). Some airlines in tough economic times have started to charge for in-flight drinks and entertainment where SIA haven’t. This commitment to quality has won the airline numerous international awards and differentiated themselves from other airlines. Some issues facing Singapore AirlinesThe Airline has purchased a number of the new Airbus Super jumbo A-380, which could be a bit premature due to the fact they are still in negotiations with the Australian government over open skies. The Australian government holds the key to Singapore gaining open skies agreements, if an agreement is reached Singapore will be able expand and benefit from long haul flights between Australia and United States. On the flip side the introduction of the new airbuses into the industry will cause less demand on Singapore as a stop-over, refuelling hub.Airlines that adopt the new airbuses will be able to bypass previous stopovers and enjoy cost savings. As explained earlier there has been a dramatic increase in demand for inter-Asia flights. Rival players have noticed the increase in demand and have implemented there own low cost airlines. E. g. Australia’s Jet Star. Recommendations and Justifications Singapore Airlines conduct a very professional business they have a strong brand, strong human resources and ma nagement, advanced facilities and a proven track record as being one of the top airlines for the last 20 years. I recommend: The airline pursue â€Å"open skies† agreements to expand there destinations. †¢ Establish the long haul routes with the new Airbus technology before rival airlines purchase the aircrafts. †¢ Keep strong emphasis on the brand name and quality of service. †¢ Utilise some of the success factor from SIA on the new low-cost airline to compete with new rival competitors establishing themselves in the Asian market. †¢ Promote Changi Airports engineering and freight facilities to the new inter-Asian airlines as long haul flights maybe bypassing Singapore’s Changi Airport in the future. Stay with the competitive advantage outlined above, using the differentiation strategy. †¢ Maintain the innovation and complimentary products. †¢ Help support the Star Alliance to improve customer satisfaction. It is very hard to recommend a lot of strategies for Singapore airlines to undertake, as they have been leaders in the industry for so long and have developed award winning strategies that have made them very successful. This report has been constructed from a wide array of research that has complemented Singapore Airlines various approaches to conducting business.

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